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I. INTRODUCTION 
When scholars study the work of the Supreme Court of Canada, we 
typically focus our attention on the Court’s written opinions. In this vol-
ume of papers drawn from Osgoode Hall Law School’s annual 
Constitutional Cases conference, as in legal writing and analysis more 
generally, scholars carefully parse the Court’s rulings — the words with 
which the justices have chosen to speak. We pay less attention to what 
the Court has chosen not to say. But the Court’s silences may speak more 
loudly than its words. The Court has the power to control the cases it will 
hear through the process of deciding whether to grant leave to appeal. 
Through the leave process, the Court decides when it will speak and 
when it will remain silent. Excavating how the Court has gone about ex-
ercising the power to choose which issues to address strikes us as an 
important task of scholarship. 
The existing scholarship on the leave to appeal process tends to focus 
on the general approach taken by the Court, as well as general trends in 
the number of leave applications and their disposition by the Court.1 Less 
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1 See Brian A. Crane & Henry S. Brown, “Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1988-89 
Term” (1990) 2 S.C.L.R. 483 (and subsequent reports published annually in the Supreme Court Law 
Review); Henry S. Brown, Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2010 (Scarborough, ON: Thomson 
Carswell, 2009); Roy B. Flemming, Tournament of Appeals: Granting Judicial Review in Canada 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004) [hereinafter “Flemming”]; Donald R. Songer, The Transformation of 
the Supreme Court of Canada: An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
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study has been undertaken of the Court’s handling of leave applications 
in specific areas of the law. This understudied part of the Court’s work 
can provide revealing information about the issues the Court does and 
does not want to address.  
This paper seeks to add to our understanding of the Court’s work by 
conducting a close examination of how it has disposed of leave applica-
tions in cases involving alleged violations of the equality rights in section 
15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 We were drawn to 
this topic in part because the Court’s relative silence on Charter equality 
rights in recent years has been more notable than what it has said in its 
rulings on section 15. For example, in its 2009 rulings that are the focus 
of this volume, the Court summarily dismissed section 15 claims in three 
rulings preoccupied with other legal issues.3 In each case, equality rights 
were a sideshow to the main event.  
We were also drawn to this topic because of our awareness, from fol-
lowing equality rights jurisprudence and scholarship4 closely, that section 
15 claims are at the moment a rapidly diminishing feature of the Cana-
dian legal landscape,5 and that the courts are significantly more likely to 
dismiss section 15 claims than they were in the past.6 Not so long ago, in 
1997, the Supreme Court declared that “[t]he rights enshrined in s. 15(1) 
                                                                                                             
2008) [hereinafter “Songer”], c. 3, “Setting the Agenda”; Ian Greene et al., Final Appeal: Decision-
Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998), at 107-12; Ian Bushnell, “Leave to 
Appeal Applications to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1982) 3 S.C.L.R. 479; Bertha Wilson, 
“Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1983) 4 Advocates’ Q. 1; Robert G. Richards, 
“Motions for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1979-1981) 2 Advocates’ Q. 460. 
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3 C. (A.) v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services), [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, [2009] 
2 S.C.R. 181, at paras. 109-111 (S.C.C.), per Abella J.; at paras. 150-152, per McLachlin C.J.C.; at 
paras. 226-231, per Binnie J. [hereinafter “C. (A.)”]; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Col-
ony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paras. 105-108 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C. 
[hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”]; Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. 
No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222, at paras. 185-202 (S.C.C.), per Rothstein J. [hereinafter “Ermineskin”]. 
4 Two excellent collections of essays that address the contemporary challenges facing Ca-
nadian equality rights jurisprudence are Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., 
Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2006) and Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rodgers, eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2006) (the same 
essays also appear in (2006) 33 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1-412). 
5 From 1989 to 2009, the number of reported judicial rulings disposing of claims alleging 
violations of s. 15 of the Charter has hovered around an annual average of 40. In the first half of 
2010, we have found only seven reported court rulings disposing of s. 15 claims. 
6 Our data on all reported judicial rulings in s. 15 claims since 1989 reveal that the rate at 
which courts find s. 15 claims to be established has dropped by close to 50 per cent in the 2004-2009 
period compared to the previous 15 years.  
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of the Charter are fundamental to Canada. They reflect the fondest 
dreams, the highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society.”7 
Since then, Charter equality rights seem to inhabit a less exalted place in 
the Canadian legal imagination. What has happened to the dreams, hopes 
and aspirations enshrined in section 15? To what extent have they been 
realized? To what extent and in what ways are litigants continuing to 
pursue the transformational promise of section 15?  
While these broader questions form a backdrop to our ongoing inves-
tigations, we cannot begin to answer them in this paper. Our modest aim 
here is to shed some light on the Supreme Court of Canada’s role in guid-
ing the development of Charter equality rights jurisprudence by focusing 
on its decision-making record in leave to appeal applications in section 
15 cases. To what extent has the Court’s interest in hearing section 15 
appeals shifted over time? What Charter equality rights issues has the 
Court chosen to address or not to address? 
We will begin by briefly describing the leave to appeal process. We 
will then describe the dataset of section 15 leave cases we have assem-
bled, and the trends in section 15 grant rates it reveals over the course of 
the past two decades. We will compare the decline in the rate at which 
the Court grants leave to appeal in section 15 cases with the grant rate in 
Charter cases generally, and will speculate about why the grant rate in 
section 15 cases has declined more sharply in the past decade than it has 
for Charter cases as a whole. We then turn to an examination of whether 
the grant rate in section 15 cases, and the rate at which appeals are al-
lowed when the Court does grant leave, differ depending on whether the 
section 15 claim was found to be established at the Court of Appeal. In 
both regards, our data reveal that the Court’s record leans heavily in fa-
vour of governments in section 15 cases. We conclude that the Supreme 
Court has played a significant role, through its management of the appeal 
process, in directing a restricted scope for Charter equality rights. 
II. THE LEAVE TO APPEAL PROCESS 
Apart from a significant minority of criminal appeals that reach the 
Supreme Court as of right, and a small number of reference questions 
directed to the Court by government, the Court exercises discretionary 
control over its docket through the power to grant or dismiss applications 
                                                                                                             
7 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 67 (S.C.C.) [herein-
after “Vriend”]. 
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for leave to appeal. First enacted in 1975, section 40(1) of the Supreme 
Court Act8 empowers the Court to grant leave to appeal to a case when it  
… is of the opinion that any question involved therein is, by reason of 
its public importance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue 
of mixed law and fact involved in that question, one that ought to be 
decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a 
nature or significance as to warrant decision by it ... 
As Songer has noted, “the statute does not define ‘public importance’ 
and the court has not published any clarifying guidelines”.9 Based on 
interviews with and articles published by the justices, and the testimony 
of former clerks, we know that the Court’s exercise of discretion on leave 
applications is driven primarily by the need to develop or clarify the law 
on issues of national importance. Leave is more likely to be granted 
when issues have a national scope, as is the case with the interpretation 
of federal statutes and the Constitution, particularly if there is a new 
point of law or a need to resolve conflicting rulings from appellate 
courts. Because of the limited number of appeals the Court can hear, cor-
recting what the Court perceives to be mistakes in the lower courts is a 
secondary consideration.10  
Several kinds of silence characterize the leave process. First, the de-
cision-making process on leave applications itself is shrouded in silence. 
For reasons of economy dictated by the sheer volume of leave applica-
tions (over 500 annually in recent years), the Court issues no reasons 
when it decides whether to grant or dismiss applications for leave to  
appeal. As a result, the leave process is characterized by a lack of trans-
parency and accountability. Apart from the statutory criterion of “public 
importance”, a formulation similar in its breadth and vagueness to ones 
the Court has condemned in other contexts as “standardless”,11 the Court 
controls its docket according to undisclosed criteria.  
Second, when the Court dismisses applications for leave to appeal, it 
chooses to remain silent on the issues at stake. It chooses not to comment 
on the dispute between the parties. It chooses not to use cases denied 
leave to contribute to the development or clarification of the law. In addi-
tion, denials of leave close off the final avenue of appeal, thereby 
                                                                                                             
8 R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
9 Songer, supra, note 1, at 46. 
10 For an overview of the literature, see Songer, id., at 46-53. 
11 See, e.g., R. v. Morales, [1992] S.C.J. No. 98, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.) (holding that 
the “public interest” is too vague and imprecise a standard to structure judicial discretion in bail 
hearings in a meaningful way). 
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confirming the precedential value of the appeal court rulings from which 
leave to appeal was sought. The power to deny leave to appeal is thus an 
important part of the Court’s role in supervising the development of Ca-
nadian law. As Flemming concluded in his recent book investigating the 
leave to appeal process,  
The administrative justification for this authority should not obscure the 
power that comes from the exercise of this discretion. Agenda-setting 
authority in a tournament of appeals constructed by the justices in 
which they are the key players augments and bolsters their impact on 
public policies and on the day-to-day concerns of government officials, 
Parliament, and Canadian citizens.12 
III. DATASET OF SECTION 15 LEAVE CASES 
Using Quicklaw, CanLII and the Supreme Court’s case information 
database,13 we compiled a dataset consisting of all of the Court’s decisions 
on leave to appeal applications in section 15 cases since September 1, 
1989.14 We included a case in our dataset if it met the following criteria:  
• the lower courts addressed a claim alleging a violation of section 15 
of the Charter, finding it to be established or not established;15  
• a party sought leave to appeal to the Court on the section 15 violation 
issue; and  
                                                                                                             
12 Flemming, supra, note 1, at 106. 
13 We conducted searches on Quicklaw’s “Supreme Court of Canada Rulings on Applica-
tions for Leave to Appeal” database and on CanLII’s “Supreme Court of Canada – Applications for 
Leave” database. We also used searches on Quicklaw and CanLII to compile a list of all appellate 
rulings on s. 15 claims, and then searched the case information database on the Court’s website using 
the names of the parties. After compiling cases from these three sources, we are confident that our 
dataset represents a comprehensive record of the Court’s decision-making on s. 15 leave applications 
(that otherwise meet our criteria of inclusion) since September 1, 1989. 
14 We used the Court’s 1989-1990 Term as our starting point because judicial interpretation 
of Charter equality rights was particularly chaotic prior to the Court’s first s. 15 ruling in Andrews v. 
Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Andrews”], released on February 2, 1989. To track patterns of decision-making in s. 15 leave appli-
cations over time, we decided to exclude the leave record in the doctrinally unstructured earliest days 
of judicial interpretation of s. 15. 
15 We characterize s. 15 claims as “established” at the Court of Appeal if the court found a 
violation of s. 15 that was not demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to s. 1. We char-
acterize s. 15 claims as “not established” at the Court of Appeal if the court did not find a violation 
of s. 15 or if the court found a violation of s. 15 that was demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit 
pursuant to s. 1. 
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• the Court granted or dismissed the application for leave to appeal 
after September 1, 1989.  
When we refer to “section 15 leave cases” or “section 15 leave ap-
plications”, we are referring to cases that meet these three criteria. 
We adopted these three criteria of inclusion to meet our objective of 
measuring patterns of Supreme Court decision-making over time on ap-
plications for leave to appeal from lower court rulings dealing with 
alleged violations of section 15 of the Charter. We did not include cases 
where section 15 is enlisted solely as an aid to the interpretation of a 
statute or other legal rule. We did not include cases that involved argu-
ments based on “equality values” (as opposed to equality rights). We did 
not include cases involving alleged violations of non-constitutional 
equality rights. Moreover, in an effort to focus our dataset on “genuine” 
section 15 appeals, if an applicant alleged a violation of section 15 for 
the first time as part of the leave to appeal application,16 we excluded the 
case from our dataset.17 We made the same decision if a section 15 viola-
tion was alleged in the lower courts, but the courts did not address it. If 
we had included these cases in our dataset, the grant rate in “genuine” 
section 15 appeals would have been distorted.18 
Using our criteria of inclusion, we generated a dataset consisting of 
177 section 15 leave cases from 1989 to 2010. For each of these cases, 
we recorded the following information:  
• whether the section 15 claim was established or not established at the 
Court of Appeal;  
• whether the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada was granted or dismissed;  
                                                                                                             
16 This happens fairly regularly as applicants for leave strive to convince the Court that their 
appeals raise issues of public importance. Some leave applicants take a “kitchen sink” approach, 
thinking, mistakenly, that adding a constitutional issue or two will add gravitas to their leave appli-
cations. 
17 Thus, for example, while leave was granted to argue s. 15 in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citi-
zenship and Immigration), [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.), since none of the 
proceedings below (involving the claimants Almrei, Charkaoui and Harkat) considered s. 15, the 
case is not included in our dataset. 
18 When a claimant seeks leave to appeal to argue a s. 15 violation, it is almost always de-
nied if the s. 15 violation has not been considered in the lower courts. Examples of exceptions to the 
general practice include Charkaoui, id., and R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) (in any case, in both cases the Court ended up devoting little attention 
to the s. 15 arguments). 
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• the date of the Supreme Court of Canada decision on the leave appli-
cation; and  
• whether the Supreme Court of Canada allowed or dismissed the ap-
peal on the section 15 issue.19  
The full list of cases, and a summary of these features of each case, 
appears in Appendix B below. 
IV. TRENDS IN DECISION-MAKING IN SECTION 15 LEAVE CASES 
The annual grant rate in section 15 leave applications is reproduced 
in Appendix A, below. While the percentage of section 15 cases granted 
leave fluctuates from year to year because of the small number of cases, 
a more discernible pattern emerges if the grant rate in section 15 cases is 
aggregated over five-year periods. From 1989 to 1994, the grant rate in 
section 15 cases was 38.5 per cent and from 1994 to 1999, it was 47.1 
per cent. The grant rate declined dramatically to 24.1 per cent from 1999 
to 2004, and declined further, to 22 per cent, from 2004 to 2009. These 
numbers are illustrated in Chart 1 below. 
 
                                                                                                             
19 We did not record whether the Court allowed or dismissed the appeal on other grounds; 
we focused exclusively on the result of the appeal on the question of whether a violation of s. 15 was 
established. 
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If one compares the numbers cumulatively by decade, from 1989 to 
1999, the Court granted leave in 31 of 73, or 42.5 per cent, of section 15 
cases; from 1999 to 2009, the Court granted leave in 22 of 95, or 23.2 per 
cent, of section 15 cases. If one includes the partial data (see Appendices 
A and B, below) available at the time of writing from the first 11 months 
of the 2009-2010 Term (one in nine cases granted leave), the cumulative 
grant rate in section 15 cases since 1999 has dipped to 22.1 per cent.  
In sum, applicants for leave in section 15 cases in the late 1990s had 
a close to even chance of being granted leave. Now, the odds of section 
15 applicants being granted leave are less than one in four and the trend 
towards increasingly longer odds is continuing. How can we explain the 
decline of over 20 per cent in the grant rate for section 15 leave applica-
tions since the 1990s?  
Part of the explanation lies in the fact that the Court’s grant rate in all 
leave applications has declined steadily in recent decades as the number 
of leave applications has increased. Between 1970 and 1990, the Court 
granted leave to 25 to 35 per cent of leave applications.20 In the 1990s, 
the grant rate declined from 22 per cent at the beginning of the decade to 
13 per cent by its conclusion.21 The average grant rate in all leave appli-
cations through the 1990s was 15 per cent.22 The overall grant rate has 
slipped even lower in recent years: from 2004 to 2009 it was 11.8 per 
cent.23 In sum, over the period covered by our study, the Court has faced 
increasing pressures on its docket that have forced it to be more selective 
in granting leave to appeal. The grant rate in section 15 cases is signifi-
cantly higher than the grant rate in leave applications as a whole. 
However, most of the drop in the Court’s overall grant rate took place in 
                                                                                                             
20 Flemming, supra, note 1, at 30. 
21 Id., at 12. 
22 Id. 
23 This number is an aggregate of the data on leave applications from 2004 to 2009 drawn 
from the annual reports published by Henry S. Brown and his co-authors. See Henry S. Brown & 
Marion Van de Wetering, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada: The 2008-2009 Term” (2009) 48 S.C.L.R. (2d) 323 (67 of 517, or 13 per cent, of 
applications granted); Henry S. Brown & Joshua A. Krane, “Annual Report on Applications for 
Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2007-2008 Term” (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
343 (53 of 576, or 9.2 per cent, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown & Maegan M. Hough, 
“Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2006-
2007 Term” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 557 (68 of 544 applications, or 12.5 per cent, of applications 
granted); Henry S. Brown & Adam J. Patenaude, “Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2005-2006 Term” (2006) 35 S.C.L.R. (2d) 311 (44 of 
494, or 8.9 per cent, of applications granted); Henry S. Brown, Brian A. Crane & M. Warren Mucci, 
“Annual Report on Applications for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada: The 2004-
2005 Term” (2005) 30 S.C.L.R. (2d) 423 (91 of 595, or 15.3 per cent, of applications granted). 
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the 1990s; since then it has declined relatively slowly. On the other hand, 
with section 15 cases, the grant rate was at its highest in the late 1990s. 
The sharp decline in section 15 grant rates has occurred in the past dec-
ade, whereas most of the decline in the Court’s overall leave granting 
rate took place earlier, in the 1990s. 
It is also helpful to consider our data on declining section 15 grant 
rates in relation to changes over time in the Court’s grant rate in Charter 
cases as a whole. Since 1990, Brian A. Crane, Henry S. Brown and their 
co-authors have published annual data in the Supreme Court Law Re-
view on grant rates in various categories of cases, including criminal and 
non-criminal Charter cases.24 Chart 2 below aggregates their data over 
five-year periods to depict the decline in the grant rate in all Charter 
cases (both criminal and non-criminal) since 1989. 
 
 
Source: Compiled from data in Brian A. Crane and Henry S. Brown et al., annual reports on applica-
tions for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Supreme Court Law Review, 1990 to 
2009. 
As Chart 2 depicts, the grant rate in Charter leave applications as a 
whole has declined at a relatively steady pace over the past 20 years, 
from a high of 23.8 per cent from 1989-1994, to a low of 15 per cent 
from 2004 to 2009. If one compiles the total leave numbers by decade, 
from 1989 to 1999 the Court granted leave in 145 of 632, or 22.9 per 
cent, of Charter cases; from 1999 to 2009, the Court granted leave in 131 
of 742, or 17.7 per cent, of Charter cases. 
                                                                                                             
24 The five most recent articles are cited, supra, note 23. 
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The decline in the grant rate in Charter cases over time is under-
standable in light of the increasing pressures on the Court’s docket and 
the declining need to provide guidance on Charter interpretation. The 
need for the Court to establish the parameters of each section of the 
Charter was more urgent in the early years of Charter adjudication. As 
Charter jurisprudence has matured over the course of the past quarter 
century — as the judiciary has added jurisprudential flesh to the Char-
ter’s textual bones — one would expect the Court’s grant rate in Charter 
leave applications to decline accordingly.  
What is true of the Charter as a whole is also true of section 15 
equality rights. In the 1990s, by granting leave to a high percentage of 
section 15 cases, the Court responded to the pressing need to provide 
guidance on a new and challenging area of the Charter. Developing the 
contours of a substantive equality approach to the interpretation of sec-
tion 15 was a shiny new judicial enterprise in the 1990s. Section 15 came 
into force in 1985, three years after the rest of the Charter. The Court’s 
first section 15 ruling, in 1989 in Andrews,25 put in place many of the 
basic principles of interpretation. The details needed to be filled in to 
provide further guidance to lower courts, governments and potential liti-
gants. In short, the high section 15 grant rate in the 1990s was in large 
part attributable to the need for the Court to develop nascent equality 
rights doctrine in its first decade interpreting section 15. Moreover, as 
divergent approaches to the interpretation of section 15 prevailed among 
members of the Court through the 1990s,26 the high grant rate may have 
been driven additionally by the Court’s attempts to bring stability and 
coherence to its section 15 jurisprudence. 
The Court finally united around a common approach to the interpre-
tation of section 15 in 1999 in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment 
and Immigration).27 Justice Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court in 
Law, set out a detailed test for the adjudication of section 15 claims.28 
The Law ruling put the need to prove a violation of human dignity at the 
heart of the section 15 test, guided by four “contextual factors”. While 
Iacobucci J. acknowledged that a need for “further elaborations and 
                                                                                                             
25 Supra, note 14. 
26 These differences came to the fore in a trilogy of decisions released in 1995: Egan v. 
Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.); Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.) and Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 
(S.C.C.). 
27 [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
28 Id., at para. 88. 
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modifications” might emerge as the jurisprudence evolves,29 the sharp 
decline in the grant rate in section 15 leave applications after 1999 likely 
reflects, at least in part, the Court’s view that it had put in place a com-
prehensive approach that provided adequate guidance to lower courts.  
We do not doubt that the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases 
generally, and in section 15 cases specifically, can be explained at least in 
part by the growth in Charter jurisprudence over time. Can the sharp de-
cline in the grant rate in section 15 cases be explained entirely by this 
maturation of the jurisprudence? In our view, it cannot, for two reasons. 
First, as we will describe below, the section 15 jurisprudence remains 
unsettled in important and troubling ways. Second, while the “maturing 
jurisprudence” hypothesis should apply equally to section 15 and other 
provisions of the Charter (with the exception that the section 15 jurispru-
dence started to develop three years later than the rest of the Charter), the 
decline in the grant rate in section 15 cases has been more dramatic than 
the decline in the grant rate in Charter cases as a whole.  
V. THE UNSETTLED STATE OF SECTION 15 JURISPRUDENCE 
As it turned out, the Law test did not achieve the stable and satisfy-
ing approach to the adjudication of section 15 claims the Court sought. 
The decade following Law was a period of continuing turbulence in the 
section 15 jurisprudence. The human dignity test introduced in Law 
proved to be unpredictable and overly burdensome on claimants. Fur-
thermore, in a series of rulings, particularly in Auton30 and Hodge,31 both 
decided in 2004, the Court took a remarkably narrow and technical ap-
proach to the question of the “appropriate comparator group”, one that 
had dire consequences for many section 15 claims. While commentators 
were quick to point out these problems with the Law test and its seque-
lae, it was not until 2008, in R. v. Kapp,32 that the Court recognized the 
need to address them. Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J., writing the 
joint opinion for the Court,33 acknowledged that 
                                                                                                             
29 Id. 
30 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia, [2004] S.C.J. No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 
657 (S.C.C.). 
31 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.). 
32 R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. 
33 Justice Bastarache wrote a separate concurrence based on s. 25 of the Charter. He noted 
that he was “in complete agreement with the restatement of the test for the application of s.15 that is 
adopted by the Chief Justice and Abella J. in their reasons for judgment.” Id., at para. 77. 
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… as critics have pointed out, human dignity is an abstract and 
subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four contextual 
factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also 
proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the 
philosophical enhancement it was intended to be. Criticism has also 
accrued for the way Law has allowed the formalism of some of the 
Court’s post-Andrews jurisprudence to resurface in the form of an 
artificial comparator analysis focussed on treating likes alike.34 
Two footnotes included in this passage cited 19 scholarly sources — 
an unusually large number — signalling the Court’s awareness of the 
depth and breadth of concern about the ongoing problems in its section 
15 jurisprudence. The Court’s diagnosis quoted above is clear: the sec-
tion 15 test it created has turned out to be confusing, unpredictable, 
overly burdensome and excessively formalistic. Yet, the Court in Kapp 
did not offer a convincing prescription to cure these ills. It took three 
modest steps to reformulate its approach to section 15(1). First, it simpli-
fied the statement of the test for establishing a violation of section 15(1), 
producing a stripped-down version, strikingly minimalist in comparison 
to the prolix statement in Law.35 The test for determining whether section 
15(1) has been violated is now as follows: 
(1) Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a disadvantage by 
perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping?36 
Second, while the Court did not explicitly say so in Kapp, it now 
seems clear, following the 2009 rulings in Ermineskin,37 C. (A.)38 and 
Hutterian Brethren,39 that section 15 claimants no longer need to prove a 
violation of human dignity.40 Third, the Court in Kapp suggested that the 
four contextual factors set out in Law would continue to play a role in the 
                                                                                                             
34 Id., at para. 22 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). 
35 Supra, note 27. 
36 Kapp, supra, note 32, at para. 17. 
37 Supra, note 3. 
38 Supra, note 3. 
39 Supra, note 3. 
40 The s. 15(1) test as stated in Kapp, supra, note 32, was reproduced in Ermineskin, supra, 
note 3, at paras. 188 and 201, per Rothstein J.; C. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 109, per Abella J., and 
at para. 150, per McLachlin C.J.C.; and Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 3, at para. 106, per McLach-
lin C.J.C. Human dignity is conspicuously absent from the s. 15(1) discussion in these cases. Instead 
of asking whether the claimant’s human dignity has been violated, the key question now is whether 
“a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground creates a disadvantage by perpetuating 
prejudice or stereotyping” (C. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 150). Note that an explicit consideration of 
the four contextual factors set out in Law was also absent from these three 2009 rulings. 
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section 15(1) analysis, albeit in a reformulated manner that remains to be 
worked out.41 Note that the Court has not yet given any indication of how 
it will reformulate its approach to comparator groups, despite its ac-
knowledgment of the artificiality and formalism of this part of the 
section 15(1) test.42 
Moreover, the Court reformulated its approach to section 15(2), the 
ameliorative program clause, in Kapp. The Court held, for the first time, 
that section 15(2) plays an “independent role”43 in protecting governmen-
tal ameliorative programs from being challenged pursuant to section 
15(1) so long as the program has an ameliorative purpose and it targets a 
disadvantaged group identified by prohibited grounds of discrimina-
tion.44 After setting out this test, the Chief Justice and Abella J. 
immediately cautioned that:  
In proposing this test, we are mindful that future cases may demand 
some adjustment to the framework in order to meet the litigants’ 
particular circumstances. However, at this early stage in the 
development of the law surrounding s. 15(2), the test we have described 
provides a basic starting point — one that is adequate for determining 
the issues before us on this appeal, but leaves open the possibility for 
future refinement.45  
In sum, the section 15(1) jurisprudence remains confusing, unpre-
dictable, overly burdensome and excessively formalistic, while the 
section 15(2) jurisprudence remains in its infancy. Given the persistence 
of significant ongoing challenges in fully developing satisfying ap-
proaches to both section 15(1) and section 15(2), we doubt that the sharp 
                                                                                                             
41 Kapp, supra, note 32, at para. 23:  
The analysis in a particular case, as Law itself recognizes, more usefully focusses on the 
factors that identify impact amounting to discrimination. The four factors cited in Law are 
based on and relate to the identification in Andrews of perpetuation of disadvantage and 
stereotyping as the primary indicators of discrimination. Pre-existing disadvantage and 
the nature of the interest affected (factors one and four in Law) go to perpetuation of dis-
advantage and prejudice, while the second factor deals with stereotyping. The 
ameliorative purpose or effect of a law or program (the third factor in Law) goes to 
whether the purpose is remedial within the meaning of s. 15(2). (We would suggest, 
without deciding here, that the third Law factor might also be relevant to the question un-
der s. 15(1) as to whether the effect of the law or program is to perpetuate disadvantage.) 
42 The intervener LEAF has urged the Court to address the comparator group issue in its 
pending ruling in Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2008] B.C.J. No. 2507, 2008 BCCA 539 
(B.C.C.A.), appeal heard and reserved March 17, 2010, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 68 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Withler”]. 
43 Kapp, supra, note 32, at para. 38. 
44 Id., at para. 41. 
45 Id. 
518 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
decline in the grant rate in section 15 leave applications in the past dec-
ade can be explained entirely by a “maturing jurisprudence” hypothesis. 
This conclusion is fortified by taking note of the sharper decline in the 
grant rate for section 15 cases compared to the decline in the grant rate in 
Charter cases generally, a point to which we will now return. 
VI. THE SHARPER RATE OF DECLINE IN THE GRANT  
RATE FOR SECTION 15 CASES 
Our five-year aggregations of Brown et al.’s annual data (depicted in 
Chart 2 above) show that the grant rate in Charter cases has declined 
over the past 20 years from a high of 23.8 per cent to a low of 15 per 
cent, while our data on the grant rate in section 15 cases over the same 
five-year periods (depicted in Chart 1 above) shows a decline from a 
high of 47.1 per cent to a low of 22 per cent.46 If we aggregate and com-
pare the data for the two decades under study (1989-1999 and 1999-
2009), the grant rate in all Charter cases dropped from 22.9 per cent to 
17.7 per cent, whereas the grant rate in section 15 cases dropped from 
42.5 per cent to 23.2 per cent. It appears that the grant rate in section 15 
cases has been consistently higher than the grant rate in Charter cases 
generally,47 although the gap has closed substantially in recent years as 
the grant rate in section 15 cases has declined more sharply. 
The proportionate decline in the grant rate over these two decades for 
section 15 cases was exactly twice as high as it was for Charter cases as a 
whole over the same period (45.4 per cent and 22.7 per cent respec-
                                                                                                             
46 Note that the grant rate in Charter cases over this period has been consistently higher than 
the grant rate in leave applications generally (on the latter, see text accompanying notes 20-23, su-
pra). This is hardly surprising, as Charter cases are more likely to raise issues the Court considers of 
“public importance”. 
47 The higher grant rate in section 15 cases compared to the grant rate in Charter cases as a 
whole would be consistent with the Court’s view that equality rights “reflect the fondest dreams, the 
highest hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society” (Vriend, supra, note 7) and also “the most 
difficult right” (Beverley McLachlin, “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
17). Nevertheless, we caution against drawing this conclusion without further investigation. The 
reason for our caution is that a comparison of the grant rate for our dataset with Brown et al.’s grant 
rate may be misleading. As we described above (text accompanying notes 13-18, supra), we used 
narrow criteria of inclusion in an effort to limit our dataset to “genuine” s. 15 appeals (for example, 
we excluded cases raising s. 15 issues on leave applications if they had not been addressed by the 
courts below). Brown et al., in their annual reports (supra, note 23), do not describe the criteria they 
used to label a case a Charter case. For example, if they used more inclusive criteria, that could 
account for the lower grant rate they found in all Charter cases compared to the grant rate we found 
in our dataset of s. 15 cases. 
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tively).48 In other words, while the odds of being granted leave in a Char-
ter case dropped by about a quarter from 1999-2009 compared to the 
previous decade, the odds of being granted leave in a section 15 case 
dropped by almost half over the same period. This data provides further 
support for the view that the decline in the section 15 grant rate cannot be 
explained entirely by evolutions in the jurisprudence. The Court’s inter-
est in developing Charter equality rights jurisprudence has declined 
dramatically since the late 1990s for reasons that cannot be explained 
entirely by a diminished need to fulfil its role in guiding the development 
of the law in the area. 
VII. THE MARGINALIZATION OF SECTION 15 IN RECENT  
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA RULINGS 
The Court’s declining interest in Charter equality rights in recent years 
becomes even clearer when one considers how little attention the Court 
ended up giving to equality rights issues in the section 15 cases to which it 
granted leave to appeal. In this section, we will review what the Court had 
to say in the section 15 cases to which it granted leave to appeal from 2004 
to 2009. This was the period with the lowest leave grant rate in section 15 
cases — nine of 41 — in any of the five-year periods depicted in Chart 1 
above. Even then, the Court’s reasons disposing of the section 15 appeals 
in five of these nine cases — B.C. Health Services,49 Baier,50 Ermineskin,51 
C. (A.),52 and Hutterian Brethren53 — relegated section 15 issues to the 
sidelines as other constitutional issues took centre stage. In a sixth case in 
this group, Fraser v. Ontario,54 a ruling on appeal is pending. It is likely 
that section 15 arguments will be given brief consideration when the Court 
releases its ruling in Fraser, as they were in the reasons of the Ontario 
                                                                                                             
48 We calculated the proportionate decline as follows: the grant rate in s. 15 cases declined 
19.3 per cent from 42.5 per cent to 23.2 per cent; 19.3 of 42.5 amounts to a proportionate decline of 
45.4 per cent. The grant rate in Charter cases declined 5.2 per cent from 22.9 per cent to 17.7 per 
cent; 5.2 of 22.9 amounts to a proportionate decline of 22.7 per cent. 
49 Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
[2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B.C. Health Services”]. 
50 Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Baier”]. 
51 Supra, note 3. 
52 Supra, note 3. 
53 Supra, note 3. 
54 Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] O.J. No. 4543, 92 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. 
C.A.) [hereinafter “Fraser”], appeal heard and reserved December 17, 2009, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 9 
(S.C.C.). 
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Court of Appeal. In a seventh case, Hislop,55 the Court had little to add on 
the issue of the section 15(1) violation to what had been said by the On-
tario Court of Appeal.56 The real issue in Hislop was the appropriate 
remedy. That leaves only two of the cases granted leave from 2004 to 2009 
― Kapp57 and Withler58 ― in which the Court engaged, or in the case of 
Withler, will engage, with section 15 in any depth. 
The Baier case involved a challenge based on section 2(b) and sec-
tion 15 of the Charter to the validity of Alberta legislation that prohibited 
public school employees from running for election as school trustees. In 
opinions focused on the freedom of expression issue, the Court upheld 
the legislation by an 8-1 vote. Writing on behalf of five members of the 
Court, Rothstein J. quickly disposed of the section 15 claim on the basis 
that occupational status is not an analogous ground of discrimination.59 
In his concurring opinion for three members of the Court, LeBel J. 
agreed that “the appellants have not made out their claim of a breach of 
equality rights in the circumstances of this case”.60  
In Ermineskin, the Court held that the challenged provisions of the 
Indian Act did not violate the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to the claim-
ant Aboriginal bands by prohibiting the investment of the bands’ share of 
royalties derived from oil and gas resources located on the bands’ re-
serves. The bands had also argued that the prohibition on investing the 
money held in trust for them deprived them of significant potential re-
turns, in violation of their rights under section 15 of the Charter. Writing 
for a unanimous Court dismissing the bands’ appeal, Rothstein J. had 
little difficulty rejecting the section 15 claim. While the law drew a dis-
tinction between funds held for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal persons, 
its purpose was to place greater control over decisions in the hands of the 
bands. Therefore, he held, “the provisions of the Indian Act that prohibit 
investment of the royalties by the Crown do not draw a distinction that 
                                                                                                             
55 Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop, [2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Hislop”]. 
56 The Court affirmed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s ruling that the challenged federal legis-
lation discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by not conferring eligibility to Canada Pension 
Plan survivor benefits on survivors whose same-sex partners died prior to January 1, 1998 and by 
failing to grant retroactive relief. In his opinion for the Court, Rothstein J. briefly dismissed the 
government’s arguments challenging the conclusion that the legislation violated s. 15: id., at paras. 
37-42. 
57 Supra, note 32. 
58 Supra, note 42. 
59 Baier, supra, note 50, at para. 65. 
60 Id., at para. 77. Justice Fish’s dissent was based on a violation of s. 2(b). He did not con-
sider the alleged violation of s. 15. 
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perpetuates disadvantage through prejudice or stereotyping. There is no 
violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.”61 
The decision in C. (A.) focused on whether the section 2(a) or section 
7 rights of a 15-year-old Jehovah’s Witness were violated by a Manitoba 
statute that authorized the administration of treatment without consent to 
“mature minors” under the age of 16. The Court, in a 6-1 opinion, dis-
missed A.C.’s Charter challenge to the legislation. In the course of its 
reasons, the Court commented briefly on the argument that the statute 
discriminated on the basis of age. Justice Abella, writing the principal 
majority opinion for four members of the Court, dismissed the section 15 
claim in a few paragraphs, concluding that the legislation is based on 
“maturity, not age, and no disadvantaging prejudice or stereotype based 
on age can be said to be engaged”.62 In her concurring opinion, McLach-
lin C.J.C. likewise had little difficulty disposing of the section 15 claim. 
In her view, the distinction drawn by the legislation on the basis of the 
age “is ameliorative, not invidious”.63 In his dissent, Binnie J. found that 
the legislation at issue violated section 2(a) and section 7 of the Charter. 
In his view it was not necessary to pursue a full section 15 analysis, as 
“the real gravamen of A.C.’s complaint is [not] age discrimination. Her 
fundamental concern is with the forced treatment of her body in violation 
of her religious convictions.”64 
Like C. (A.), the Hutterian Brethren ruling also focused on a claim 
based on freedom of religion, giving only cursory treatment to the argu-
ment that the claimants’ equality rights were violated by Alberta’s photo 
requirement for driver’s licences. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a 
4-3 majority, dismissed the Charter challenge to the regulation. While a 
section 15 violation was assumed in the courts below, the Chief Justice 
found that “it is weaker than the s. 2(a) claim and can easily be dispensed 
with”.65 In her view: 
Assuming the respondents could show that the regulation creates a 
distinction on the enumerated ground of religion, it arises not from any 
demeaning stereotype but from a neutral and rationally defensible 
policy choice. There is no discrimination within the meaning of 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, as 
explained in Kapp. The Colony members’ claim is to the unfettered 
                                                                                                             
61 Ermineskin, supra, note 3, at para. 202. 
62 C. (A.), supra, note 3, at para. 111. 
63 Id., at para. 152. 
64 Id., at para. 231. 
65 Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 3, at para. 105. 
522 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
practice of their religion, not to be free from religious discrimination. 
The substance of the respondents’ s. 15(1) claim has already been dealt 
with under s. 2(a). There is no breach of s. 15(1).66 
In separate dissents, Abella J. and LeBel J. found that the challenged 
regulation violated section 2(a) and could not be justified pursuant to 
section 1. Even though their analyses were founded on the burdensome 
impact of the law on a vulnerable religious minority, neither dissent 
made any mention of the section 15 claim. 
The tendency to collapse equality rights concerns into an analysis fo-
cused on alleged violations of civil liberties evident in C. (A.) and 
Hutterian Brethren is also exemplified by the Court’s earlier ruling in 
B.C. Health Services.67 At issue was the constitutional validity of B.C. 
legislation that interfered with the collective bargaining rights of unions 
representing health care workers. The vast majority of the employees 
affected by the legislation were women. The unions argued that the Act 
discriminated on the basis of sex (among other grounds) and also vio-
lated their freedom of association. The Court focused its opinion on the 
latter argument, finding that parts of the Act violated freedom of associa-
tion protected by section 2(d) of the Charter. The violation could not be 
upheld pursuant to section 1 because the government had failed to dem-
onstrate that the Act impaired freedom of association as little as 
reasonably possible in order to achieve its objective of improving health 
care delivery.68 After reaching this conclusion, McLachlin C.J.C. and 
LeBel J., in their joint majority opinion, disposed of the section 15 argu-
ment briskly in a single paragraph: 
… we conclude that the distinctions made by the Act relate essentially 
to segregating different sectors of employment, in accordance with the 
long-standing practice in labour regulation of creating legislation 
specific to particular segments of the labour force, and do not amount 
to discrimination under section 15 of the Charter. The differential and 
adverse effects of the legislation on some groups of workers relate 
essentially to the type of work they do, and not to the persons they are. 
Nor does the evidence disclose that the Act reflects the stereotypical 
application of group or personal characteristics. Without minimizing 
the importance of the distinctions made by the Act to the lives and 
work of affected health care employees, the differential treatment based 
                                                                                                             
66 Id., at para. 108. 
67 Supra, note 49. 
68 Id., at para. 156. 
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on personal characteristics required to get a discrimination analysis off 
the ground is absent here.69 
Like the Court’s ruling in Hutterian Brethren, this passage seems to 
ignore the concept of adverse effects discrimination, supposedly a cen-
trepiece of the Court’s commitment to a substantive conception of 
equality.70 Adverse effects discrimination occurs when neutral rules have 
a disproportionate impact on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation. There is no need to prove a discriminatory intention; the focus is 
on effects. In B.C. Health Services, even though the Act had “painful”,71 
dramatic and unusual effects72 on the rights of health care workers, a 
group composed predominantly of women, the Court found the Act was 
not discriminatory. Without further explanation from the Court regarding 
the difference between B.C. Health Services and successful adverse ef-
fects discrimination claims, it is difficult to understand why the 
disproportionate impact of the B.C. legislation on women was insuffi-
cient to get an adverse effects discrimination analysis “off the ground”.73 
In Fraser, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the challenged On-
tario statute violated the right to collective bargain of agricultural 
workers contrary to section 2(d) of the Charter. The claimants also chal-
lenged the statute as a violation of section 15. The Court of Appeal 
devoted the bulk of its reasons to the section 2(d) violation. It made brief 
                                                                                                             
69 Id., at para. 165. In her reasons dissenting on the s. 2(d) issue, Deschamps J. agreed with 
the majority that “no claim of discrimination contrary to s. 15 of the Charter has been established”. 
Id., at para. 170. 
70 In Andrews, supra, note 14, at para. 37, in defining discrimination for the purposes of  
s. 15, the Court adopted the definition of adverse effects discrimination put forward in Ontario (Hu-
man Rights Commission) v. Simpsons Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 74, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, at 551 
(S.C.C.). The Court has reaffirmed the view that s. 15(1) prohibits adverse effects discrimination on 
a number of occasions. For examples of decisions where the Court found that equality rights were 
violated by the adverse effects, or disproportionate impact, of neutral rules, see Vriend, supra, note 
7, at para. 82 (failure to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has disproportion-
ate impact on gays and lesbians); Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 
86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”] (failure to provide public funding for 
interpretation in hospitals has disproportionate impact on the hearing impaired). The leading case in 
the statutory anti-discrimination context is British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations 
Commission) v. BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance), [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
(aerobic test for firefighters has disproportionate negative impact on women). 
71 Supra, note 49, at para. 166. 
72 Id., at para. 160. 
73 For an excellent discussion, see Judy Fudge, “Conceptualizing Collective Bargaining un-
der the Charter: The Enduring Problem of Substantive Equality” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 213, at 
227-43 [hereinafter “Fudge”]. Fudge points out that “the impact of selecting health care workers was 
disproportionately to disadvantage women workers” (at 238) and that “the Court’s analysis ignored 
the extent to which labour legislation reflects and reinforces historical patterns of labour market 
discrimination and segregation” (at 241). 
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comments dismissing the section 15 claim, citing and following the con-
clusions of the Supreme Court in B.C. Health Services and Baier. In the 
Court’s view, “there is no basis for finding that ‘agricultural worker’ is an 
analogous ground”. Differential treatment of workers in a particular 
“economic sector” does not implicate “a personal characteristic of the 
type necessary to support a section 15 claim”.74 If it follows the recent 
trend, the pending Supreme Court ruling on appeal in Fraser will focus 
on the section 2(d) claim, with the section 15 claim relegated to a side-
bar. 
The failure of the Court to engage with adverse effects discrimina-
tion arguments was also evident in Charkaoui.75 The Court did briefly 
discuss and dismiss a section 15 argument that the security certificate 
regime in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act76 discriminates 
against non-citizens by subjecting them to lengthy periods of detention.77 
The Court did not consider worthy of comment arguments of adverse 
effects discrimination against Arab and Muslim men raised by three 
interveners.78 These interveners pointed to the prejudice and stereotyping 
faced by Arab and Muslim persons in Canada post-9/11. They alleged 
that racial profiling had contributed to the discriminatory application of 
the IRPA contrary to section 15. They situated their arguments in Can-
ada’s history of discriminatory immigration laws and policies that 
discriminated against vulnerable and stigmatized immigrant communities 
during times of heightened security.79 These issues had not been explored 
in the courts below, as the constitutional challenges brought by Almrei, 
Charkaoui and Harkat to the security certificate regime had focused on 
section 7 of the Charter.  
One can understand the reluctance of the Court in Charkaoui to 
comment on the issue of adverse effects discrimination without the bene-
fit of a full factual record and legal argument in the lower courts. The 
Court’s reluctance may also be explained by the fact that the section 15 
                                                                                                             
74 Fraser, supra, note 54, at para. 114. 
75 Supra, note 17. The Charkaoui ruling is excluded from our dataset because the lower 
courts did not discuss s. 15 of the Charter. 
76 S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”]. 
77 Charkaoui, supra, note 17, at paras. 129-132. 
78 See the facta of the Canadian Arab Federation; the Canadian Council for Refugees, Afri-
can Canadian Legal Clinic, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, and National Anti-
Racism Council of Canada; and the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations, and Canadian 
Muslim Civil Liberties Association. 
79 For a full discussion of the equality arguments raised by the interveners in Charkaoui, see 
Karen Morimoto, “Section 15 of the Charter and the Supreme Court of Canada’s Response in 
Charkaoui” (unpublished manuscript, December 2009, on file with the authors). 
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constitutional question it framed was limited to the question of discrimi-
nation between citizens and non-citizens. Nevertheless, the Court could 
have given some much-needed life support to the concept of adverse ef-
fects discrimination in section 15 jurisprudence by at least pointing to the 
reasons why it did not consider it to be established, or even worthy of 
serious consideration, in this case. By failing to comment on the inter-
veners’ arguments, the Court’s ruling in Charkaoui adds to the 
impression left by B.C. Health Services that the Court now views adverse 
effects discrimination arguments as being outside of section 15’s purview 
altogether. 
Our discussion above has described the short shrift given to section 
15 arguments in five of the nine cases to which the Court granted leave 
in the 2004-2009 period. This review demonstrates that the Court’s di-
minishing engagement with section 15 is evident not only in the 
historically low grant rate in leave applications during this period; it is 
also evidenced by the alarming brevity and superficiality of the Court’s 
dismissal of section 15 arguments in the majority of the section 15 cases 
to which it has granted leave.  
VIII. WHO IS GRANTED LEAVE TO APPEAL IN SECTION 15 CASES? 
In addition to tracking changes over time in the grant rate in section 
15 cases, our dataset allows us to determine whether the chances of being 
granted leave to appeal in section 15 cases differ depending on whether 
section 15 violations are established or not established at the Court of 
Appeal.  
Beginning with the 1989-1990 Term, the Court has disposed of 177 
applications for leave to appeal in section 15 cases (see Appendices A 
and B). In 159 of these cases, the claimant failed to establish a violation 
of section 15 at the Court of Appeal. The Court granted leave to appeal in 
roughly one quarter of these cases (41 of 159, or 25.8 per cent). In a 
much smaller group of cases, the claimant established a violation of sec-
tion 15 at the Court of Appeal. When leave was sought, usually by the 
government, from a finding that Charter equality rights had been vio-
lated, the Court granted leave most of the time — in 13 of 18 cases (or 
72.2 per cent). In other words, the odds of being granted leave if a sec-
tion 15 violation was not established at the Court of Appeal are roughly 1 
in 4; the odds of being granted leave if a section 15 violation was estab-
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lished at the Court of Appeal are roughly 3 in 4. These results are de-




Our finding that a substantial disparity exists in section 15 grant rates 
depending on whether a section 15 violation was established or not es-
tablished at the Court of Appeal is unsurprising for a number of reasons. 
Often section 15 claims are made without a strong legal or evidentiary 
foundation. Among the 159 cases where a violation was not established 
at the Court of Appeal, therefore, are a significant number of miscon-
ceived or poorly presented section 15 claims. Of course these claims fail 
in the lower courts and then are denied leave to appeal. In contrast, each 
of the 18 cases where a violation was established at the Court of Appeal 
feature, by definition, viable section 15 claims. They are, as a result, 
much more likely to be granted leave. Furthermore, a finding by a Court 
of Appeal that a government law or policy has discriminated contrary to 
section 15 of the Charter in a manner that cannot be upheld pursuant to 
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section 1 virtually guarantees that an issue of public importance is at 
stake.  
Nevertheless, the size of the disparity is striking — when a section 
15 claim is established at the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Canada is almost three times as likely to grant leave to appeal compared 
to when a section 15 violation is not established at the Court of Appeal. 
The odds of being granted leave in section 15 cases lean heavily in fa-
vour of governments. 
While the pressures on the Court’s docket mean that it cannot grant 
leave to every case raising issues of public importance, the frequency 
with which the Court fails to hear appeals of strongly argued section 15 
claims that were rejected at the Court of Appeal is difficult to square with 
the view that equality rights “reflect the fondest dreams, the highest 
hopes and finest aspirations of Canadian society”.80 Those dreams, hopes 
and aspirations are frequently dashed in the leave process, particularly in 
recent years as the leave rate in section 15 cases has plummeted. Let us 
offer a few examples.  
The Court has dismissed applications for leave to appeal in a series 
of cases, most recently in Boulter v. Nova Scotia,81 raising the issue of 
whether poverty or receipt of social assistance is an analogous ground of 
discrimination.82 As a result, a quarter-century after section 15 came into 
force, litigants still have no authoritative ruling from the top court on 
whether the poor can benefit from Charter equality rights.  
In addition to the issue of discrimination on the basis of poverty, the 
Boulter case involved a claim that Nova Scotia legislation precluding the 
adjustment of power rates for low income consumers amounted to ad-
verse effects discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability and 
marital status, among other grounds. Five low-income claimants pro-
vided evidence, supported by nine experts and a public interest 
intervener. The claimants’ “impressive presentation”, as Fichaud J.A. 
described it at the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal,83 included demographic 
                                                                                                             
80 Vriend, supra, note 7. 
81 Boulter v. Nova Scotia Power Inc., [2009] N.S.J. No. 64, 2009 NSCA 17 (N.S.C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Boulter”]. See also Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services), 
[1996] O.J. No. 363, 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20 (Ont. Gen. Div.), leave to appeal refused, [1996] O.J. No. 
1526 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Masse”]; R. v. Banks, [2007] O.J. No. 99, 275 D.L.R. (4th) 640 (Ont. 
C.A.) [hereinafter “Banks”].  
82 Had the appeal not been abandoned after leave was granted, the Court would have had an 
opportunity to address the issue of discrimination on the basis of receipt of social assistance in 
Falkiner v. Ontario, [2002] O.J. No. 1771, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 633 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Falki-
ner”]. 
83 Boulter, supra, note 81, at para. 84. 
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evidence of the over-representation among the poor of disabled persons, 
women, single mothers, racial minorities, recent immigrants, children 
and the elderly.84 When a claim is this well assembled and raises pro-
found constitutional issues that the Court has yet to address (whether 
poverty is an analogous ground, whether the disparate impact of such a 
law amounts to adverse effects discrimination), issues that have long 
been the subject of academic debate85 and conflicting lower court rul-
ings,86 the denial of leave to appeal is disconcerting to say the least. 
As we described above, the Court’s ruling in Kapp reformulated the 
tests for section 15(1) and section 15(2). At the same time, the Court sig-
nalled the need for further adjustments to the section 15(1) test to relieve 
claimants of its overly burdensome and formalistic aspects. Likewise, it 
invited future refinements to the new section 15(2) test it offered as a 
“basic starting point”. Despite the Court’s recognition of the need for 
further guidance and development of the section 15 jurisprudence, it has 
granted leave to appeal in only three of 20 section 15 leave applications 
since the release of Kapp.87 A number of the cases denied leave would 
have offered excellent opportunities to provide further clarification and 
development of the shift in direction signalled by Kapp. 
For example, in Downey,88 the first section 15 ruling issued by an 
appellate court following Kapp, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld 
Nova Scotia workers’ compensation regulations capping benefits for 
chronic pain at a low level. The Downey case was a sequel to the  
                                                                                                             
84 Id., at para. 48. 
85 Martha Jackman, “The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter” (1988) 20 Ot-
tawa L. Rev. 257; Martha Jackman, “Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social Welfare 
Claims” (1993) 19 Queen’s L.J. 65; Martha Jackman, “Constitutional Contact with the Disparities in 
the World: Poverty as a Prohibited Ground of Discrimination Under the Canadian Charter and Hu-
man Rights Law” (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 76; Margot Young, ed., Poverty: Rights, Social 
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007). 
86 Examples of cases supporting the view that receipt of social assistance or poverty is an 
analogous ground include: Falkiner, supra, note 82; Schaff v. Canada, [1993] T.C.J. No. 389, [1993] 
2 C.T.C. 2695 (C.T.C.); R. v. Rehberg, [1993] N.S.J. No. 35, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 336 (N.S.S.C.); Dart-
mouth Halifax (County) Regional Housing v. Sparks, [1993] N.S.J. No. 97, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 224 
(N.S.S.C.). Examples of cases supporting the view that receipt of social assistance or poverty is not 
an analogous ground include: Boulter, supra, note 81; Masse, supra, note 81; Banks, supra, note 81; 
Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C. v. Vancouver, [2002] B.C.J. No. 493, 2002 BCSC 105 
(B.C.S.C.); Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 2908, 66 O.R. (3d) 600 (Ont. 
S.C.J.); Ross v. Charlottetown (City), [2008] P.E.I.J. No. 23, 2008 PESCAD 6 (P.E.I.S.C.); Tous-
saint v. Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1034, 2009 FC 873 (F.C.A.). 
87 See Appendix B. The three s. 15 cases granted leave since the release of the ruling in 
Kapp are Fraser, supra, note 54; Withler, supra, note 42; and Cunningham v. Alberta (Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development), [2009] A.J. No. 133, 2009 ABCA 53 (Alta. C.A.). 
88 Downey v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Appeals Tribunal), [2008] N.S.J. No. 
314, 2008 NSCA 65 (N.S.C.A.) [hereinafter “Downey”]. 
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Supreme Court’s ruling in Martin,89 in which the Court held, reversing an 
opinion written by Cromwell J.A. at the Court of Appeal,90 that the com-
plete denial of benefits for chronic pain under Nova Scotia’s workers’ 
compensation scheme constituted discrimination on the basis of physical 
disability contrary to section 15. The Nova Scotia government responded 
by providing benefits for chronic pain ranging from 3 per cent to a 
maximum of 6 per cent (of 75 per cent of pre-accident gross weekly 
earnings).  
In Downey, Cromwell J. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court 
of Appeal, upholding the six per cent cap for reasons similar to those he 
gave in Martin for upholding the denial of any benefits to injured work-
ers for chronic pain. Justice Cromwell’s reasons in Downey applied the 
Law test as if it was “business as usual” after Kapp. After considering the 
appropriate comparator group, and the four contextual factors, he con-
cluded that the 6 per cent cap on benefits did not demean the dignity of 
workers suffering from chronic pain.91 He gave no apparent weight to the 
Supreme Court’s dicta in Kapp that human dignity should not be treated 
as a legal test, nor to the Court’s suggestion that section 15(1) claimants 
need to be relieved of the excessive burdens and formalism that have 
characterized section 15(1) jurisprudence. Despite the fact that granting 
leave in Downey would have given the Court an opportunity to clarify 
these issues, the Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.  
In Harris,92 another post-Kapp section 15 case denied leave by the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Court of Appeal divided over whether the 
challenged provisions of the Canada Pension Plan discriminated on the 
basis of disability. To qualify for a disability pension, workers must have 
made mandatory contributions to the Plan in four of the last six years 
prior to the date of their application. In order to help parents meet these 
requirements, a “child-rearing drop out” (“CRDO”) provision allows the 
years that a contributor stayed home to care for his or her children before 
they reach the age of seven to be dropped out of the contribution history. 
The assumption of the provision is that parents have a greater ability to 
return to the workforce once their children are in full-time school. The 
                                                                                                             
89 Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compen-
sation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.). 
90 Martin v. Workers’ Compensation Board (Nova Scotia), [2000] N.S.J. No. 353, 192 
D.L.R. (4th) 611 (N.S.C.A.), revd [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, 231 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.). 
91 Downey, supra, note 88, at para. 82. 
92 Harris v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development), [2009] F.C.J. 
No. 70, [2009] 4 F.C.R. 330 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Harris”]. 
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claimant had to stay home to care for her disabled child beyond the age 
of seven and was unable to meet the requirements for a disability pension 
as a result.  
The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the CRDO provision 
did not violate section 15. One member of the majority, Ryer J.A., found 
that the claimant was not denied a benefit provided by the law.93 The 
other member of the majority, Evans J.A., found that the law was aimed 
at the legitimate purpose of extending benefits to “parents who temporar-
ily leave employment to look after young children”;94 it did not amount 
to differential treatment on the basis of disability.95 In his dissent, Linden 
J.A. was alone in recognizing that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kapp 
“calls for a recommitment to the ideal of substantive equality”.96 In his 
view, the law was based on the stereotypical view “that children seven 
years of age and older are capable of attending school full-time”, a view 
that does not reflect “the different circumstances of disabled children 
who are not able to attend school full-time and continue to require ongo-
ing full-time home care”.97  
Granting leave to appeal in Harris would have given the Supreme 
Court an opportunity to address the three different approaches to the sec-
tion 15 issue articulated at the Court of Appeal. In particular, the Court 
could have explored the issue of whether the law imposed disadvantage 
through the operation of stereotype, the nub of the disagreement between 
Evans and Linden JJ.A., and a question at the heart of the section 15(1) 
test as reformulated in Kapp. In addition, the Court could have addressed 
whether the CRDO provision constitutes a program with an ameliorative 
purpose targeted at a disadvantaged group defined by prohibited grounds 
of discrimination, in accordance with the Court’s approach to section 
15(2) set out in Kapp. The Court’s decision to deny leave in Harris un-
fortunately deprives us of answers to these questions. 
In sum, even though it has acknowledged that the section 15(1) ju-
risprudence remains confusing, unpredictable, overly burdensome and 
excessively formalistic, and that the section 15(2) jurisprudence remains 
in its infancy, and even though it has been presented with a number of 
compelling section 15 leave applications, the Supreme Court persists in 
its recent tendency to deny leave in section 15 cases at historically high 
                                                                                                             
93 Id., at para. 106. 
94 Id., at para. 81 (emphasis in original). 
95 Id., at para. 92. 
96 Id., at para. 27. 
97 Id., at para. 57. 
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rates, particularly if a section 15 violation has not been established at the 
Court of Appeal.  
IX. RESULTS OF APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF  
CANADA IN SECTION 15 CASES 
When the Supreme Court of Canada does grant leave in section 15 
cases, what does our dataset tell us about the results on appeal? Is the 
likelihood of the Court allowing the appeal different depending on 
whether the section 15 claim was established at the Court of Appeal?  
We found that when a section 15 claim was established at the Court 
of Appeal, the Supreme Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the 
section 15 challenge in 6 of 11 cases, or 54.5 per cent of appeals. When 
the section 15 claim was not established at the Court of Appeal, the Court 
has allowed the appeal and found an unjustifiable violation of section 15 
in 6 of 38 cases, or 15.8 per cent of appeals. In other words, when the 
Supreme Court hears an appeal by a party, usually the government, from 
a Court of Appeal ruling that upheld a section 15 claim, the appellant has 
a better than even chance of prevailing at the Supreme Court on the sec-
tion 15 issue. In contrast, when a claimant appeals from a Court of 
Appeal ruling dismissing a section 15 claim, the appellant has a less than 
1 in 6 chance of prevailing at the Supreme Court on the section 15 issue. 
These results are depicted in Chart 4 below. 
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Our data reveal that just as governments have much better odds of 
being granted leave by the Supreme Court of Canada in section 15 cases 
(Chart 3), the odds of succeeding on appeal in section 15 cases likewise 
lean heavily in favour of governments (Chart 4).  
X. CONCLUSION 
While equality rights have received little attention in the Court’s re-
cent case law (with the exception of Kapp), equality concerns have not 
been absent. For example, in B.C. Health Services, the Court placed em-
phasis on the Charter value of equality to support its recognition of a 
right to collective bargain as an element of freedom of association pro-
tected by section 2(d) of the Charter.98 As the Chief Justice and LeBel J. 
wrote, “[o]ne of the fundamental achievements of collective bargaining 
is to palliate the historical inequality between employers and employ-
ees.”99 Yet, as we described above, the Court tersely dismissed the claim 
based on equality rights in a manner that, as Judy Fudge has pointed out, 
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“both reflects and promotes an idea of equality directed at fighting 
stereotypes to the exclusion of fostering substantive equality”.100 
While the Court regularly affirms its commitment to interpreting sec-
tion 15 as embodying a commitment to substantive equality, it usually 
does so for the purpose of dismissing section 15 claims and narrowing 
the scope of equality rights. One lesson embodied in substantive equality 
is that differential treatment based on prohibited grounds is not necessar-
ily discriminatory. Another is that treating people the same when they are 
differently situated can have discriminatory effects on the basis of pro-
hibited grounds. The first lesson is a staple of the jurisprudence, leading 
regularly to the dismissal of section 15 claims. The second lesson is often 
ignored, leading regularly to the dismissal of claims based on adverse 
effects discrimination. As a result, rather than signalling the commence-
ment of a rich contextual inquiry into historical disadvantage and the 
possible impact of a challenged law in sustaining relations of social sub-
ordination, the ritual incantation of a commitment to substantive equality 
has become, perversely, the death knell of Charter equality rights claims. 
As we discussed above, the Court’s ruling last year in Hutterian 
Brethren,101 dismissing a Charter challenge to the addition of a photo 
requirement to Alberta driver’s licence regulations, is typical of the 
Court’s tendency to focus on other Charter rights and freedoms and their 
reasonable limits to the exclusion of any serious consideration of equality 
rights. The majority opinion of McLachlin C.J.C. dismissed the claim 
based on section 15 on the grounds that any negative impact of the law 
on the Hutterian Brethren “arises not from any demeaning stereotype but 
from a neutral and rationally defensible policy choice”.102 The dissenters, 
like the majority, focused exclusively on the unjustifiable violation of 
freedom of religion. Justice Abella’s dissent emphasized the risks the 
photo requirement posed to the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the re-
ligious community.103 She pointed out that the majority’s opinion was 
inconsistent with the principle that once the state has provided a benefit 
(such as licensing operators of motor vehicles), it must do so in a non-
discriminatory manner.104 In his dissent, LeBel J. noted that a driver’s 
licence “is often of critical importance in daily life and is certainly so in 
                                                                                                             
100 Fudge, supra, note 73, at 216. 
101 Supra, note 3. 
102 Id., at para. 108. 
103 Id., at paras. 114, 164-170. 
104 Id., at para. 171, citing Eldridge, supra, note 70. 
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rural Alberta”.105 “A small group of people”, he remarked, “is being 
made to carry a heavy burden.”106 
As Nathalie Des Rosiers points out in this volume, religious dis-
crimination, including discrimination against the Hutterites, is “a-well 
known fact of our history”.107 In Hutterian Brethren, the Court was con-
fronted with a law that has a disproportionately burdensome impact on a 
vulnerable religious minority whose way of life has been targeted by the 
provincial government in the past. Is this not a scenario that ought to be 
addressed by the prohibition on religious discrimination in section 15 of 
the Charter? How has the jurisprudence come to a point where section 15 
has been essentially taken out of the discussion even though a govern-
ment policy has subordinating effects based on a prohibited ground of 
discrimination?  
It is true, as Des Rosiers writes, that freedom of religion can do much 
of the work necessary to prevent state subordination of religious groups: 
“in Canada, freedom of religion has always had strong anti-discrimination 
and equality undertones”.108 Peter Hogg has noted that the Court has 
tended to interpret equality rights restrictively, while giving substantial 
weight to equality values in the interpretation of the scope and limits of 
other Charter rights and freedoms.109 This phenomenon continues with 
recent rulings such as BC Health Services and Hutterian Brethren — 
equality concerns are displaced to, and subsumed within, a discussion of 
                                                                                                             
105 Hutterian Brethren, id., at para. 201. 
106 Id. 
107 Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Freedom of Religion at the Supreme Court in 2009: Multiculturalism 
at the Crossroads?”, in this volume,  at 76. See William Janzen, Limits on Liberty: The Experience of 
Mennonite, Hutterite and Doukhobor Communities in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1990). The Hutterian Brethren ruling is not the first time that the Court has been insensitive to the po-
tential for majoritarian hostility to the Hutterites’ religious beliefs and practices. The Hutterites live in 
rural colonies where the land is held in common in accordance with their religious beliefs. In Walter v. 
Alberta (Attorney General), [1969] S.C.J. No. 4, [1969] S.C.R. 383 (S.C.C.), the Court managed to 
ignore the history of anti-Hutterite animus that motivated the enactment of the Communal Property Act 
of 1947 (and its predecessors) and the lack of any plausible legislative purpose, related to “property and 
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Sanders, “The Hutterites: A Case Study in Minority Rights” (1964) 42 Can. Bar Rev. 225. The Act was 
repealed in 1972, a few years after the Walter ruling.  
108 Des Rosiers, id., at 75. On the relationship between equality and religious freedom, see 
also Bruce Ryder, “The Canadian Conception of Equal Religious Citizenship” in Richard Moon, ed., 
Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2008) 87. 
109 Peter W. Hogg, “Equality as a Charter Value in Constitutional Interpretation” (2003) 20 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 113, at 117: “[T]he Charter value of equality,” he wrote, “is being imported into the 
definition of other Charter rights or into the section 1 analysis. In this way, what are really equality 
claims can be remedied under other rights without the need to bother with listed and analogous 
grounds or human dignity, the two severe restrictions on the application of s. 15.” (footnotes omit-
ted) 
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civil liberties. Hogg speculated that there might be a connection, however 
elusive and difficult to understand, between the Court’s warm embrace of 
equality values and its cool distance from equality rights.110 He concluded 
with a cautious endorsement of the Court’s approach, suggesting that it 
might make sense because it allows for heightened scrutiny of violations of 
the civil liberties of vulnerable or disadvantaged groups, while limiting 
section 15 to a restricted role of remedying “classifications that are based 
on listed or analogous grounds and impair human dignity”.111  
We are less comfortable than Professor Hogg with the tendency of 
the Court to shift equality concerns from section 15 to other Charter 
rights and freedoms. Of course, a basic constitutional value like equality 
should assist in the interpretation of all Charter provisions. Indeed, such 
an approach is mandated by Canada’s international commitments to pro-
tecting all fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.112 
But a provision requiring non-discrimination in the enjoyment of other 
rights and freedoms should not be confused with a free-standing prohibi-
tion on discrimination. Section 15 should provide, through a large and 
liberal interpretation, an independent guarantee of equality rights that 
overlaps with and extends beyond protection provided by other Charter 
rights and freedoms. 
In a case like Hutterian Brethren, by essentially ignoring religious 
equality rights, and focusing on religious freedom alone, we blinker our 
legal vision. The Charter protects from state interference with the prac-
tice of religion (section 2(a)) and from state discrimination on the basis 
of religion (section 15). The two provisions are closely related, but one 
does not exhaust the other. A meaningful, independent role ought to be 
accorded to each. What is lost when equality rights are submerged? Do 
equality rights not provide a way of viewing social and legal context that 
adds to the lens provided by civil liberties?  
                                                                                                             
110 Id., at 133. 
111 Id., at 134. 
112 See Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 Decem-
ber 1966, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
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Equality rights jurisprudence recognizes a restricted number of per-
sonal characteristics as prohibited grounds of discrimination. The 
recognized grounds are ones that have been deployed persistently and 
pervasively as tools of power. As Reva Siegel has written: 
… antidiscrimination law regulates the social practices that sustain 
group inequality. The group inequalities that concern antidiscrimination 
law are typically those that are socially pervasive (articulated across 
social domains) and socially persistent (articulated over time). When 
inequality among groups is structurally pervasive and persistent in this 
way, we typically refer to it as a condition of social stratification.113  
Equality rights are meant to focus our attention on removing laws or 
practices whose effects perpetuate relations of social subordination based 
on the personal characteristics of historically disadvantaged groups. Are 
we confident that dynamics of this kind were absent from the Alberta 
government’s treatment of the Wilson Colony or from the B.C. govern-
ment’s treatment of predominantly female health care workers?114 How 
can we be confident of the answers to these questions when they were 
passed over so superficially in the Court’s rulings in Hutterian Brethren 
and B.C. Health Services? 
Returning to the Chief Justice’s brief reasons dismissing the section 
15 claim in Hutterian Brethren,115 can we say that when laws pursue “ra-
tionally defensible policy choices” they should be immunized from 
scrutiny for discriminatory effects violating section 15? Can we say a law 
is “neutral” if it has adverse effects on the basis of a prohibited ground of 
discrimination? The jurisprudence on disability discrimination emphati-
cally provides negative answers to these questions. For example, in 
Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education,116 Sopinka J. in his majority 
opinion eloquently described the “‘mainstream’ attributes” that can “act 
as headwinds to the enjoyment of society’s benefits” for the disabled.117 
In his words: 
… it is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune 
society so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the 
relegation and banishment of disabled persons from participation, 
                                                                                                             
113 Reva Siegel, “Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How ‘Color Blindness’ Discourse 
Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification” (2000) 88 Calif. L. Rev. 77, at 82. 
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115 See text accompanying note 66, supra. 
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which results in discrimination against them. The discrimination 
inquiry which uses the “attribution of stereotypical characteristics” 
reasoning as commonly understood is simply inappropriate here. It may 
be seen rather as a case of reverse stereotyping which, by not allowing 
for the condition of a disabled individual, ignored his or her disability 
and forces the individual to sink or swim within the mainstream 
environment. It is recognition of the actual characteristics, and the 
reasonable accommodation of these characteristics which is the central 
purpose of section 15(1) in relation to disability.118 
The type of “reverse stereotyping” to which Sopinka J. refers — the 
failure to consider the distinct needs and circumstances of politically 
vulnerable and socially subordinated groups — is particularly relevant to 
people with disabilities. But it is not a phenomenon restricted to the dy-
namics of disability discrimination. Reverse stereotyping may undergird 
incidences of discrimination involving any of the enumerated and analo-
gous grounds of discrimination recognized by section 15. The grounds 
are recognized precisely because they have been persistently and perva-
sively deployed by the law — or ignored by the law — in ways that 
promote relations of social subordination.119 A full Charter analysis must 
interrogate, from an equality rights perspective, the possibility that such 
dynamics continue to operate. 
As the analysis we have presented makes clear, to say that Charter 
equality rights are not in judicial vogue is an understatement. Will the 
Supreme Court of Canada continue to preside over the twilight of Char-
ter equality rights or will it invigorate the dreams, hopes and aspirations 
they embody? The mystery and silence that surrounds the leave to appeal 
process make this question difficult to answer. We are left to speculate on 
the reasons for the sharp decline in the Court’s interest in Charter equal-
ity rights. Perhaps the Court is of the view that the dreams, hopes and 
aspirations expressed by section 15 have been accomplished. Perhaps the 
Court’s recent record on equality rights is a reflection of broader political 
and cultural shifts which are unsupportive of a continuing strong role for 
anti-discrimination law, exemplified by the cancellation of the Court 
Challenges Program and of other funding for equality-seeking groups. 
Perhaps the main sources of systemic inequalities lie beyond the Char-
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ter’s reach.120 Perhaps the Court’s commitment to substantive equality 
will always be circumscribed by liberal legalism121 and an unwillingness 
to utilize section 15 to redistribute material resources.122 Whatever the 
explanations are for the increasing circumscription of Charter equality 
rights, wise potential claimants know that they need to be cautious before 
placing hopes in costly and burdensome section 15 litigation. Our analy-
sis suggests that Charter equality rights may be reinvigorated, from a 
moribund to at least a modest role, particularly if the Court is willing to 
recognize new analogous grounds, to take seriously claims based on ad-
verse effects discrimination, and to implement other shifts in the 
jurisprudence that relieve claimants of the onerous burdens they now 
face in proving that differential treatment on prohibited grounds amounts 
to discrimination. 
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Appendix A: Annual Disposition of 
Leave to Appeal Applications in 
Section 15 Cases 
 






1989-1990 8 1 12.5 % 
1990-1991 9 3 33.3 % 
1991-1992 10 4 40.0 % 
1992-1993 7 4 57.1 % 
1993-1994 5 3 60.0 % 
1994-1995 2 1 50.0 % 
1995-1996 5 2 40.0 % 
1996-1997 12 8 66.7 % 
1997-1998 11 3 27.3 % 
1998-1999 4 2 50.0% 
1999-2000 12 3 25.0 % 
2000-2001 11 2 18.2 % 
2001-2002 9 2 22.2 % 
2002-2003 15 6 40.0 % 
2003-2004 7 0 0.0 % 
2004-2005 6 2 33.3 % 
2005-2006 7 1 14.3 % 
2006-2007 5 2 40.0 % 
2007-2008 13 2 15.4 % 
2008-2009 10 2 20.0 % 
2009-2010123 9 1 11.1 % 
Total 177 54 30.5 % 
                                                                                                             
123 Up to July 31, 2010. 
540 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Appendix B: Disposition of Leave to 
Appeal Applications in  
Section 15 Cases Since 1989 
We characterize section 15 claims to be “established” at the Court of Ap-
peal if the court found a violation of section 15 that was not 
demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit pursuant to section 1. We 
characterize section 15 claims as “not established” at the Court of Appeal 
if the court did not find a violation of section 15 or if the court found a 
violation of section 15 that was demonstrably justified as a reasonable 
limit pursuant to section 1. The final column in the chart below for “re-
sult of appeal” refers to the result on the section 15 claim alone.  
 















1989-1990 Term (1 of 8 granted) 
1. R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen 20809 
21392 
No Granted, 19 
Oct. 1989 
Dismissed  




3. Mun. Contr. Ltd. v. IUOE 
Local 721 








5. Skalbania v. Wedge. Vill. Est. 
Ltd. 
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1990-1991 Term (3 of 9 granted) 
9. Canada v. Chiarelli 21920 No Granted, 8 
Nov. 1990 
Dismissed  




11. Schachter v. Canada 21889 Yes Granted, 15 
Nov. 1990 
Dismissed  
12. Canada v. Central Cartage 
Co. 








14. R. v. Généreux 22103 No Granted, 7 
Feb. 1991 
Dismissed  
15. Alc. Found’n of Man. v. 
Winnipeg 












1991-1992 Term (4 of 10 granted) 




19. Murphy v. Welsh 22542 No Granted, 6 
Feb. 1992 
-124 
20. Auger v. Alberta  22557 No Dismissed, 
6 Feb. 1992 
- 
21. Weatherall v. Canada  22633 No Granted, 6 
Feb. 1992 
Dismissed 




23. Symes v. Canada 22659 No Granted, 26 
Mar. 1992 
Dismissed 
                                                                                                             
124 After leave was granted in Murphy v. Welsh, the claimant did not pursue the s. 15 viola-
tion issue. See [1991] S.C.C.A. No. 283. 
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26. Miron v. Trudel 22744 No Granted, 4 
Jun. 1992 
Allowed 
27. Cdn Assn of Reg’d Imp. v. 
Canada  




1992-1993 Term (4 of 7 granted) 
28. Jones v. Ont; Rheaume v. 
Ontario 




29. Haig v. Canada 23223 No Granted, 22 
Oct. 1992 
Dismissed 
30. R. v. Finta 23097 No Granted, 10 
Dec. 1992 
Dismissed  




32. NWAC v. Canada 23253 No  Granted, 11 
Mar. 1993 
Dismissed 
33. Rodriguez v. British Colum-
bia 
23476 No Granted, 23 
Mar. 1993 
Dismissed 




1993-1994 Term (3 of 5 granted) 




36. Egan v. Canada 23636 No Granted, 14 
Oct. 1993 
Dismissed 
37. Benner v. Canada  23811 No Granted, 10 
Mar. 1994 
Allowed 
38. Thibaudeau v. Canada 24154 Yes Granted, 23 
Jun. 1994 
Allowed 
39. McCarten v. Prince Edward 
Island 
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1994-1995 Term (1 of 2 granted) 
40. Adler v. Ontario 24347 No Granted, 2 
Feb. 1995 
Dismissed 
41. Schachtschneider v. Canada 23698 No Dismissed, 
1 Jun. 1995 
- 
1995-1996 Term (2 of 5 granted) 
42. Lewis v. Burnaby School 
Dist. #41 




43. Eaton v. Brant Co. Bd. of 
Educ’n 
24668 Yes Granted, 26 
Oct. 1995 
Allowed 




45. Eldridge v. British Columbia 24896 No Granted, 9 
May 1996 
Allowed 




1996-1997 Term (8 of 12 granted) 
47. Vriend v. Alberta 25285 No Granted, 3 
Oct. 1996 
Allowed 




49. Law v. Canada  25374 No Granted, 5 
Dec. 1996 
Dismissed 




51. Vancouver SIVMW v.  
Canada  
25359 No Granted, 6 
Mar. 1997 
Dismissed 




53. M. v. H. 25838 Yes Granted, 24 
Apr. 1997 
Dismissed  
54. Corbiere v. Canada  25708 Yes Granted, 27 
Apr. 1997 
Dismissed  
55. Orlowski v. British  
Columbia  
25751 No Granted, 8 
May 1997 
Dismissed 
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56. Bese v. British Columbia  25855 No Granted, 8 
May 1997 
Dismissed 
57. Winko v. British Columbia  25856 No Granted, 8 
May 1997 
Dismissed 




1997-1998 Term (3 of 11 granted) 
59. Delisle v. Canada  25926 No Granted, 16 
Oct. 1997 
Dismissed 
















64. Lovelace v. Ontario 26165 No Granted, 12 
Feb. 1998 
Dismissed 
65. R. v. LePage 26320 No Granted, 19 
Feb. 1998 
Dismissed 
66. A & L Investments Ltd. v. 
Ontario  
















1998-1999 Term (2 of 4 granted) 
70. Granovsky v. Canada  26615 No Granted, 8 
Oct. 1998 
Dismissed 
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73. Little Sisters v. Canada  26858 Yes Granted, 18 
Feb. 1999 
Dismissed  
1999-2000 Term (3 of 12 granted) 
74. Ont. Pub. School Bds’ Assn. 
v. Ont. 




















79. Dunmore v. Ontario 27216 No Granted, 24 
Feb. 2000 
Dismissed  








82. Lavoie v. Canada 27427 No Granted, 25 
May 2000 
Dismissed 
83. Gosselin v. Quebec  27418 No Granted, 1 
Jun. 2000 
Dismissed 
84. Pawar v. Canada 27578 No Dismissed, 
8 Jun. 2000 
- 




2000-2001 Term (2 of 11 granted) 
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89. Nova Scotia v. Walsh 28179 Yes Granted, 15 
Feb. 2001 
Allowed 








92. Vachon c. Société  
d’aménagement  




93. Nova Scotia v. Martin & 
Laseur 
28370 No Granted, 14 
Jun. 2001 
Allowed 












2001-2002 Term (2 of 9 granted) 
97. Théroux c. Commission 
Scolaire  
28166 No Dismissed, 
6 Sep. 2001 
- 
98. Siemens v. Manitoba  28416 No Granted, 13 
Sep. 2001 
Dismissed 
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101. Trociuk v. British  
Columbia 
28726 No Granted, 8 
Nov. 2001 
Allowed 








104. Ayangma v. Prince Edward 
Isand 








2002-2003 Term (6 of 15 granted) 
106. CFCYL v. Canada  29113 No Granted, 17 
Oct. 2002 
Dismissed 




108. Ent. W.F.H. Ltée. c.  
Quebec 








110. Falkiner v. Ontario  29294 Yes Granted, 20 
Mar. 2003 
-125 
111. Hodge v. Canada  29351 Yes Granted, 20 
Mar. 2003 
Allowed 




113. Webb v. Waterloo Police 
S.B. 








                                                                                                             
125 After leave was granted in Falkiner v. Ontario, a notice of discontinuance was filed. See 
[2002] S.C.C.A. No. 297. 
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115. Gosselin (Tutor of) v.  
Quebec 
29298 No Granted, 24 
Apr. 2003 
Dismissed 








118. Auton v. British Columbia  29508 Yes Granted, 15 
May 2003 
Allowed 
119. Newfoundland v. N.A.P.E. 29597 No Granted, 5 
Jun. 2003 
Dismissed 





2003-2004 Term (0 of 7 granted) 
121. Chippewas of Nawash v. 
Canada  




























2004-2005 Term (2 of 6 granted) 
128. Fitzgerald v. Alberta 30453 No Dismissed, 
6 Jan. 2005 
- 
129. R. v. Mackenzie 30359 No Dismissed, 
3 Feb. 2005 
- 
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130. Health Services v. B.C. 30554 No Granted, 21 
April 2005 
Dismissed 




132. Canada v. Hislop 30755 Yes Granted, 23 
June 2005 
Dismissed 




2005-2006 Term (1 of 7 granted) 




135. Kempling v. B.C.C. of 
Teachers 




136. Manoli v. Canada 31039 No Dismissed, 
9 Feb. 2006 
- 








139. Baier v. Alberta 31526 No Granted, 28 
July 2006 
Dismissed 
140. Métis N.C. of Women v. 
Canada 




2006-2007 Term (2 of 5 granted) 








143. R. v. Kapp 31603 No Granted, 14 
Dec. 2006 
Dismissed 
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145. Ermineskin Indian Band v. 
Cda 
31875 No Granted, 30 
Aug. 2007 
Dismissed 
2007-2008 Term (2 of 13 granted) 
146. Melanson v. New Bruns-
wick 




147. C. (A.) v. Manitoba 31955 No Granted, 25 
Oct. 2007 
Dismissed 
148. Alberta v. Hutterian  
Brethren 
32186 Yes Granted, 29 
Nov. 2007 
Allowed 












152. Zhang v. Canada 32209 No Dismissed, 
7 Feb. 2008 
- 




154. Moresby Explorers Inc. v. 
Cda 
















158. Guzman v. Canada 32409 No Dismissed, 
3 July 2008 
- 
2008-2009 Term (2 of 10 granted) 
159. Giacomelli Estate v.  
Canada 
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165. Fraser v. Ontario 32968 No Granted, 2 
April 2009 
Pending 
166. Withler v. Canada 33039 No Granted, 28 
May 2009 
Pending 








2009-2010 Term126 (1 of 9 granted) 




















                                                                                                             
126 To July 31, 2010. 
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175. Cunningham v. Alberta 33340 Yes Granted, 11 
April 2010 
Pending 




177. Ray v. The Queen 33610 No Dismissed, 
24 June 
2010 
- 
 
